A Comparison of British and Soviet Tank Tactics
As follows is a study and comparison of British Army and Red Army tank tactics, as written by the Canadian Armoured Corps in May of 1944. The study, uses an article written by a Soviet officer and British manuals and reports as sources. For context, the study notes that the organization and tank strength of a Soviet Armoured Corps and a British Armoured Division is generally similar.
General
(a) Exploitation of a breakthrough is carried out by a large mobile group of all arms acting directly under the front (or army) command. An armoured corps may form part of the group, or may act independently for this task.
(b) From a position in the rear, the armoured corps moves up to a lying up place under cover of darkness. If the latter is only 15 to 20 kilometres from the front, it can also be used a jumping-off place, and a regulating line is indicated to time the advance.
(c) The exact moment at which the armoured corps should be thrown in is very difficult to decide. The guiding principle is that the armour should be in line with the advancing infantry at the moment the latter overruns the main defenses and captures the enemy artillery positions.
(d) This entails the armoured corps commands together with the tank formations, being up with the headquarters of the forward formations commands from the beginning of the operations.
(e) Once the armored corps is launched into the gap it is controlled by mobile headquarters moving in the rear of the tank formations.
Frontages
The armoured corps must be given a strip 8 to 10 kilometres wide, and on each flank of this strip 3 to 5 kilometres must be allowed to ensure security from the enemy's mortar and observed artillery fire. This means that the normal frontage for an armoured corps in the gap of a breakthrough should be 15 to 20 kilometres.
Engineers
Engineer units placed under the command of the armoured corps must be detailed to clear obstacles and minefields and to improve routes.
Artillery
A special artillery group must be formed to neutralize the fire of enemy artillery and mortar batteries firing from the flank of the gap. The command of this artillery group must direct the fire of the whole group and be himself at the headquarters of the armoured corps to ensure a quick response to the latter's demands.
Air Support
Experience has shown that the best results are achieved when air force units are placed directly under command of the armoured corps. A representative should be at the headquarters of the armored corps and have his own means of communication.
Tank Reconnaissance
Tank personnel must be included in the reconnaissance parties of other arms, and sometimes special tank reconnaissance patrols must be organized. The latter should move behind the infantry into the gap, and then pass ahead of them on boundaries previously detailed, as the battle develops.
Exploitation of Success
The armoured corps as a rule will bypass any remaining enemy strongpoints or destroy them on the move.
The first day's operations in a breakthrough will usually be limited to action against the enemy reserves which are being moved into the gap. If there is danger of the gap being closed by these reserves, the armoured corps must strike and destroy them as quickly as possible in order not to fail in the execution of the main task.
The second and subsequent days' operations in a breakthrough will usually be occupied in surrounding and destroying the enemy main body, and if the enemy retires, in pursuit.
Defense Against Enemy Armour
If large enemy tank formations are met, the armoured corps should hold off the enemy tanks by a screen of all its anti-tank weapons and the use of tanks in ambush.
Administration
The war has shown that tank formations can fight for 2 or 3 days, and after a break of 12 to 24 hours for maintenance and repairs, can sometimes continue for another 2 or 3 days. After 5 to 7 days of continuous action, plus a strenuous 2 or 3 day preparatory period, an armoured corps must be taken our of the battle for rest and mechanical repair.
General
(a) An armoured division will seldom be required to fight an action in which other formations have not been, or will not be engaged. Its employment will usually be preceded by operations carried out by other divisions, and exploitation of its success will seldom be possible if addition formations, which may include armoured divisions, are not available for this purpose.
(b) All tanks, prior to battle, will be grouped in a suitable area in the rear some 5 to 7 miles (8 to 11 kilometres) behind their forming up point. The forming up point should be out of view of enemy ground observation. It is advisable for the tanks and the infantry to form up square to their objective so that there is no necessity for a pause on the start line.
(c) "The main attack began at 0300 hours on 6 May, and was made.... by the 4(Mixed) Division on the right, and the 4 Indian Division on the left., supported by Churchill tanks and the concentrated fire of over 600 guns. Behind the attacking divisions the 6 Armoured Division (right) and the 7 Armoured Division (left) were drawn up in an approximate order of march with their heads about level with the gun area, and were led forward into the battle close behind the attacking infantry... by 1100 hours the infantry attack had penetrated deeply enough into the enemy defenses to allow the armoured divisions to be launched through the gap"
(d) Tank brigade... officers will then, without delay, make contact with their opposite numbers in the infantry, living and working with them until D Day.
The regimental command should move wherever he can best control his command and at the same time be near the infantry battalion command during the action. Close liaison between the two officers is essential for success.
(e) The armoured division command will himself directly control the action, since he alone will be in a position to appreciate the whole situation, and by handling all the components of his division, to ensure a balance between the necessity for maintaining the impetus of the attack, for mopping up the battlefield, and for provision throughout of secure pivots on which each phase of the attack is successively based.
Frontage
Whatever the form of attack, the frontage will be narrow. The main thrust (or thrusts) will be directed against a vital point in the enemy's defenses, and all the resources of the division will be employed in giving it impetus.
It will seldom be practicable to advance on a greater frontage than 10 to 12 miles (16 to 19 kilometres). Such a frontage will generally afford the greatest likelihood of finding forward unobstructed routes, while permitting coordination of control and rapid concentration for battle.
Engineers
The primary role of the engineers is to assist the armoured division in maintaining its mobility. Even if the crust of the enemy's resistance has been broken, numerous demolitions, minefields, and other obstacles probably will have been prepared and must be overcome to permit the free manoeuvre of an armoured division. The overcoming of these obstacles is primarily the task of the engineers.
Artillery
The success of armoured operations is largely dependent on the effective cooperation of the artillery of the armoured division. In attack, guns provide support, and during attack it is the fire of the division's artillery that forces enemy anti-tank gun crews to seek cover and cease firing on advancing tanks. During consolidation and in defense. guns form the framework of the divisional dispositions.
Since the divisional commander normally will be directly controlling the course of operations, the Command, the Royal Artillery Commander will usually be with him, or in his immediate vicinity.
Air Support
Both air and artillery support must be directed onto targets by tactical reconnaissance aircraft or by Forward Observation Officers who will be with the assaulting troops.
An offensive is largely dependent for success on maximum cooperation from the beginning between the army and the RAF. To achieve this cooperation, a joint army-air headquarters will always be established.
Aircraft should be able to operate with minimum interference, and the army should suffer minimum delay and loss by enemy air action. These requirements can best be met by a high degree of air superiority. The gaining and retention of air superiority, and control of the air at least over areas where major action is taking place, is therefore the overriding task of air forces allotted to the army in an offensive.
The army will require air reconnaissance, direct and indirect air support and air cover. Reconnaissance and indirect support are required almost continuously. Direct support and air cover will be necessary at intervals, and in varying intensity.
The main principle of employment of either direct support in close proximity to our own troops or indirect support at a distance from our troops is that concentrated and repeated attack on a limited number of targets that will achieve the best results.
Air cover may be required to enable our concentrations to take place unobserved, to protect formations when refueling or on other occasions when dispersion is difficult, and to cover major outflanking movements.
Direct air support will be of the greatest importance, particularly when the advance is so rapid as to tend to outstrip the artillery support.
Tank Reconnaissance
The tank officers will accompany infantry patrols by day and night to examine the ground and enemy defense. Tank officers should make a point of contacting artillery observation post officers, who are often in a position to pinpoint enemy anti-tank, field gun, and machine gun positions.
Exploitation of Success
The guiding rule is that the destruction of the enemy's whole army is the object, and that an armoured division normally will achieve its purpose by rapid, unceasing advance rather than pausing to deal with bodies or pockets of the enemy which will be mopped up in due course by other formations advancing in its wake.
If a gap has to be driven through any considerable enemy defensive positions by an infantry attack, supported by a coordinated fire plan, the delay before the beginning of the armoured brigade attack will probably be considerable.
When the attack of the armoured brigade is launched, frequently it will have to overcome much opposition, which will involve a series of "fire fights," possibly continuing for some time. This will be especially true if enemy tank or anti-tank guns are in the vicinity.
Every possible means will be adopted to avoid delay. The attack if the armoured brigade will be closely supported by the motorized battalion, the self-propelled anti-tank artillery, and by engineers. Immediately its objective has been gained, a new advance pivot will be formed by these troops. Units of the infantry brigade, of anti-tank artillery, and of engineers will move forward at once, either to support closely the attack on the next objective, or to relieve the troops engaged in temporary consolidation of the ground that has been captured.
Full use must be made of motorized transport, which must be handled with the utmost boldness to get men and guns as far forward as possible consistent with avoidance of heavy casualties. Only in this way can momentum be maintained and deep and quick penetration be secured.
Defense Against Enemy Armour
So long as the enemy retains any armour, the chief counter to its successful employment rests in the skillful use of anti-tank guns.
The most careful reconnaissance of suitable hull-down positions (for tanks) to engage enemy armour wherever it may endeavour to operate is essential. The advantage will then rest with the defense, since besides favorable conditions for engaging the enemy from such hull-down positions, the ground will be known and the full support of all types of artillery will be available. Therefore, the art of selecting hull-down positions to counter every possible enemy move must be studied carefully by all ranks, for in the ability to select such positions lies the chief asset in defensive tank warfare.
Administration
The execution of successful military operations always is dependent largely on the efficacy of the administrative services. This statement is particularly applicable to operations carried out by an armoured division.
A man or horse can carry on for a limited time after all food and water has been consumed, but a mechanical vehicle will not move a single yard when its fuel has been exhausted. A tank, even if it has plenty of fuel and water, is for all practical purposes temporarily useless and to some extent a liability rather than an asset, unless it has ammunition for its gun.
Fuel and ammunition (in addition to food and water) have to be brought up to an armoured division in unarmoured vehicles, often over long distances through country exposed to enemy air and ground attacks.
The administrative mechanism will usually have to operate without any direct assistance from fighting echelons under conditions that will always be difficult and that occasionally require almost superhuman efforts to overcome.
A considerable quantity of fuel and ammunition always will be carried in assistant echelon, and often a proportion of the vehicles carrying these supplies will move with the fighting echelon.
Source: 2/TRG NOTES CAC/1 (SD 7a)
Soviet
General
(a) Exploitation of a breakthrough is carried out by a large mobile group of all arms acting directly under the front (or army) command. An armoured corps may form part of the group, or may act independently for this task.
(b) From a position in the rear, the armoured corps moves up to a lying up place under cover of darkness. If the latter is only 15 to 20 kilometres from the front, it can also be used a jumping-off place, and a regulating line is indicated to time the advance.
(c) The exact moment at which the armoured corps should be thrown in is very difficult to decide. The guiding principle is that the armour should be in line with the advancing infantry at the moment the latter overruns the main defenses and captures the enemy artillery positions.
(d) This entails the armoured corps commands together with the tank formations, being up with the headquarters of the forward formations commands from the beginning of the operations.
(e) Once the armored corps is launched into the gap it is controlled by mobile headquarters moving in the rear of the tank formations.
Frontages
The armoured corps must be given a strip 8 to 10 kilometres wide, and on each flank of this strip 3 to 5 kilometres must be allowed to ensure security from the enemy's mortar and observed artillery fire. This means that the normal frontage for an armoured corps in the gap of a breakthrough should be 15 to 20 kilometres.
Engineers
Engineer units placed under the command of the armoured corps must be detailed to clear obstacles and minefields and to improve routes.
Artillery
A special artillery group must be formed to neutralize the fire of enemy artillery and mortar batteries firing from the flank of the gap. The command of this artillery group must direct the fire of the whole group and be himself at the headquarters of the armoured corps to ensure a quick response to the latter's demands.
Air Support
Experience has shown that the best results are achieved when air force units are placed directly under command of the armoured corps. A representative should be at the headquarters of the armored corps and have his own means of communication.
Tank Reconnaissance
Tank personnel must be included in the reconnaissance parties of other arms, and sometimes special tank reconnaissance patrols must be organized. The latter should move behind the infantry into the gap, and then pass ahead of them on boundaries previously detailed, as the battle develops.
Exploitation of Success
The armoured corps as a rule will bypass any remaining enemy strongpoints or destroy them on the move.
The first day's operations in a breakthrough will usually be limited to action against the enemy reserves which are being moved into the gap. If there is danger of the gap being closed by these reserves, the armoured corps must strike and destroy them as quickly as possible in order not to fail in the execution of the main task.
The second and subsequent days' operations in a breakthrough will usually be occupied in surrounding and destroying the enemy main body, and if the enemy retires, in pursuit.
Defense Against Enemy Armour
If large enemy tank formations are met, the armoured corps should hold off the enemy tanks by a screen of all its anti-tank weapons and the use of tanks in ambush.
Administration
The war has shown that tank formations can fight for 2 or 3 days, and after a break of 12 to 24 hours for maintenance and repairs, can sometimes continue for another 2 or 3 days. After 5 to 7 days of continuous action, plus a strenuous 2 or 3 day preparatory period, an armoured corps must be taken our of the battle for rest and mechanical repair.
British
(a) An armoured division will seldom be required to fight an action in which other formations have not been, or will not be engaged. Its employment will usually be preceded by operations carried out by other divisions, and exploitation of its success will seldom be possible if addition formations, which may include armoured divisions, are not available for this purpose.
(b) All tanks, prior to battle, will be grouped in a suitable area in the rear some 5 to 7 miles (8 to 11 kilometres) behind their forming up point. The forming up point should be out of view of enemy ground observation. It is advisable for the tanks and the infantry to form up square to their objective so that there is no necessity for a pause on the start line.
(c) "The main attack began at 0300 hours on 6 May, and was made.... by the 4(Mixed) Division on the right, and the 4 Indian Division on the left., supported by Churchill tanks and the concentrated fire of over 600 guns. Behind the attacking divisions the 6 Armoured Division (right) and the 7 Armoured Division (left) were drawn up in an approximate order of march with their heads about level with the gun area, and were led forward into the battle close behind the attacking infantry... by 1100 hours the infantry attack had penetrated deeply enough into the enemy defenses to allow the armoured divisions to be launched through the gap"
(d) Tank brigade... officers will then, without delay, make contact with their opposite numbers in the infantry, living and working with them until D Day.
The regimental command should move wherever he can best control his command and at the same time be near the infantry battalion command during the action. Close liaison between the two officers is essential for success.
(e) The armoured division command will himself directly control the action, since he alone will be in a position to appreciate the whole situation, and by handling all the components of his division, to ensure a balance between the necessity for maintaining the impetus of the attack, for mopping up the battlefield, and for provision throughout of secure pivots on which each phase of the attack is successively based.
Frontage
Whatever the form of attack, the frontage will be narrow. The main thrust (or thrusts) will be directed against a vital point in the enemy's defenses, and all the resources of the division will be employed in giving it impetus.
It will seldom be practicable to advance on a greater frontage than 10 to 12 miles (16 to 19 kilometres). Such a frontage will generally afford the greatest likelihood of finding forward unobstructed routes, while permitting coordination of control and rapid concentration for battle.
Engineers
The primary role of the engineers is to assist the armoured division in maintaining its mobility. Even if the crust of the enemy's resistance has been broken, numerous demolitions, minefields, and other obstacles probably will have been prepared and must be overcome to permit the free manoeuvre of an armoured division. The overcoming of these obstacles is primarily the task of the engineers.
Artillery
The success of armoured operations is largely dependent on the effective cooperation of the artillery of the armoured division. In attack, guns provide support, and during attack it is the fire of the division's artillery that forces enemy anti-tank gun crews to seek cover and cease firing on advancing tanks. During consolidation and in defense. guns form the framework of the divisional dispositions.
Since the divisional commander normally will be directly controlling the course of operations, the Command, the Royal Artillery Commander will usually be with him, or in his immediate vicinity.
Air Support
Both air and artillery support must be directed onto targets by tactical reconnaissance aircraft or by Forward Observation Officers who will be with the assaulting troops.
An offensive is largely dependent for success on maximum cooperation from the beginning between the army and the RAF. To achieve this cooperation, a joint army-air headquarters will always be established.
Aircraft should be able to operate with minimum interference, and the army should suffer minimum delay and loss by enemy air action. These requirements can best be met by a high degree of air superiority. The gaining and retention of air superiority, and control of the air at least over areas where major action is taking place, is therefore the overriding task of air forces allotted to the army in an offensive.
The army will require air reconnaissance, direct and indirect air support and air cover. Reconnaissance and indirect support are required almost continuously. Direct support and air cover will be necessary at intervals, and in varying intensity.
The main principle of employment of either direct support in close proximity to our own troops or indirect support at a distance from our troops is that concentrated and repeated attack on a limited number of targets that will achieve the best results.
Air cover may be required to enable our concentrations to take place unobserved, to protect formations when refueling or on other occasions when dispersion is difficult, and to cover major outflanking movements.
Direct air support will be of the greatest importance, particularly when the advance is so rapid as to tend to outstrip the artillery support.
Tank Reconnaissance
The tank officers will accompany infantry patrols by day and night to examine the ground and enemy defense. Tank officers should make a point of contacting artillery observation post officers, who are often in a position to pinpoint enemy anti-tank, field gun, and machine gun positions.
Exploitation of Success
The guiding rule is that the destruction of the enemy's whole army is the object, and that an armoured division normally will achieve its purpose by rapid, unceasing advance rather than pausing to deal with bodies or pockets of the enemy which will be mopped up in due course by other formations advancing in its wake.
If a gap has to be driven through any considerable enemy defensive positions by an infantry attack, supported by a coordinated fire plan, the delay before the beginning of the armoured brigade attack will probably be considerable.
When the attack of the armoured brigade is launched, frequently it will have to overcome much opposition, which will involve a series of "fire fights," possibly continuing for some time. This will be especially true if enemy tank or anti-tank guns are in the vicinity.
Every possible means will be adopted to avoid delay. The attack if the armoured brigade will be closely supported by the motorized battalion, the self-propelled anti-tank artillery, and by engineers. Immediately its objective has been gained, a new advance pivot will be formed by these troops. Units of the infantry brigade, of anti-tank artillery, and of engineers will move forward at once, either to support closely the attack on the next objective, or to relieve the troops engaged in temporary consolidation of the ground that has been captured.
Full use must be made of motorized transport, which must be handled with the utmost boldness to get men and guns as far forward as possible consistent with avoidance of heavy casualties. Only in this way can momentum be maintained and deep and quick penetration be secured.
Defense Against Enemy Armour
So long as the enemy retains any armour, the chief counter to its successful employment rests in the skillful use of anti-tank guns.
The most careful reconnaissance of suitable hull-down positions (for tanks) to engage enemy armour wherever it may endeavour to operate is essential. The advantage will then rest with the defense, since besides favorable conditions for engaging the enemy from such hull-down positions, the ground will be known and the full support of all types of artillery will be available. Therefore, the art of selecting hull-down positions to counter every possible enemy move must be studied carefully by all ranks, for in the ability to select such positions lies the chief asset in defensive tank warfare.
Administration
The execution of successful military operations always is dependent largely on the efficacy of the administrative services. This statement is particularly applicable to operations carried out by an armoured division.
A man or horse can carry on for a limited time after all food and water has been consumed, but a mechanical vehicle will not move a single yard when its fuel has been exhausted. A tank, even if it has plenty of fuel and water, is for all practical purposes temporarily useless and to some extent a liability rather than an asset, unless it has ammunition for its gun.
Fuel and ammunition (in addition to food and water) have to be brought up to an armoured division in unarmoured vehicles, often over long distances through country exposed to enemy air and ground attacks.
The administrative mechanism will usually have to operate without any direct assistance from fighting echelons under conditions that will always be difficult and that occasionally require almost superhuman efforts to overcome.
A considerable quantity of fuel and ammunition always will be carried in assistant echelon, and often a proportion of the vehicles carrying these supplies will move with the fighting echelon.
Source: 2/TRG NOTES CAC/1 (SD 7a)
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