Motorisation in Wehrmacht, Foreign acquisitions and first combat experiences.

Loot Force One begins

   In the previous article, I jumped a fair bit ahead, and I nearly forgot about one very interesting aspect of Wehrmacht's procurement - common thievery. Or rather, the use of captured equipment, surely the most extensive in WW II, and perhaps the most extensive ever.

Austria: First steps

   Anschluss gave Germans a great opportunity to practice mobile operations outside of combat, and they also acquired a modest number of austrian weapons and factories for their own use. Bofors 40 mm AA guns that continued production after the Anschluss in Vienna Arsenal, along with a small number of Oerlikon 20 mm guns, several thousand artillery pieces and small arms . Most important, for the motorpool atleast, was the addition of Steyr company, and several other small companies that provided space and production capacities to manufacture many competitive truck types, like Steyr 640, a 1,5 ton, 6x4 vehicle, which was one of the first foreign truck used by Wehrmacht in bigger numbers, with 3780 produced.[1] Also noteworthy was the ADGZ armored car, 3 of which were used in the battle of the Danzig post office, and more were later used by SS in the Balkans. [2]

 

Steyr 640 in usual configuration. This type of truck was also used as an ambulance.

One of ADGZ armored cars during the Battle of the Danzig Post Office.

Czechoslovakia: The motherload

   After the Munich agreement, and subsequent invasion of Czechoslovakia, a world of new opportunities opened up for the Wehrmacht. Czechs were the owner of the biggest (relative to the size of their country) arms and automotive industry in Europe. By tricking allies into giving up Czechoslovakia bloodlessly, What is more, Germans agreed to buy several hundreds of guns from Czechs before they struck. [3] Altogether, with these "sales", that were never payed for, Germans acquired 750,000 small arms, more than 12,000 mortars, AT-guns, AA-guns and artillery, [4]Equally important was the addition of hundreds of LT. 35 and LT. 38 tanks, either captured, or produced in time for Invasion of Poland. These tanks would be used to form armored units in many formations, first of them being 1st and 3rd Leichte divisions before the attack against Poland, and later 7th, 12th, 19th and 20th Panzer divisions for campaigns in France and Soviet Union. Automotive industry captured was also extensive. Factories of various companies, like Tatra, Škoda, Praga, Aero and other produced a large variety of cars and trucks, for both civilians and army. Most numerous of these were the Tatra 27 (3ton truck), manufactured from 1930 to 1947, with 3,708 produced, Praga RN type (2-2,5ton truck), manufactured between 1933-1943, 3,061 units, Praga AN (1-1,75ton truck), manufactured between 1924-1940 with 5,416 units and Skoda trucks of 254 and 256 model, 3ton trucks, together about 7,000 produced, used also as ambulances and engineering vehicles, modified even with wood-gas engines.[5]

Honorable mentions go to OA vz. 30, armored car manufactured by Tatra, based on 6x4 Tatra T-72 chassis, that was in use with german Ordnungspolizei as late as June 1941,[6] several types of heavy trucks with load capacity of up to 8 tons, and licence production of Skdfz. 10 and 11. Czech factories also produced Skdfz. 140/1, or the Aufklarungspanzer 38(t), Jagdpanzer 38(t), Sdkfz. 138/1 Grille ausf. H and M and several types of Marders, contributing to the motorisation of artillery and AT-guns in Wehrmacht. [7]

Convoy of Tatra 27 trucks.

   

Example of Praga RN.

   German domestic production, in the meantime, amounted to some 422,291 vehicles in 1938, 87,611 being trucks, the number in 1939 being  593,381 and 101,745 respectively.[8]

Poland: Baptism of Fire

   Polish army was poorly motorised and mechanised - for example, in 1936 there were only 140 cars and trucks in the entire nation for each infantry division to be mobilized,[9] and they had a very small quantity of obsolete tankettes. This along with german air superiority, and limited number of obsolete polish artillery, meant that rear elements where most of trucks and other vehicles operated were in no great danger of losses from enemy action, compared to german tanks - here the losses were substantial, with 217 tanks destroyed and 457 knocked-out, which represented a rather geat part of 2,626 tanks comitted.[10]

  Truck losses, and vehicle losses broadly, were very mild in comparison. There were just 1,480 trucks lost between 8 armies (1st, 3rd, 4th. 5th, 7th, 8th, 10th and 14th) out of a total of 4,744 vehicles lost (other tank tanks), with motorcycles being the biggest share of losses.[11]

   

   Operation uncovered several weaknesses in german supply and repair system. Most critical was practically the complete lack of spare tires and rubber pads for tank tracks. For example, XIX Army Corps reported that only 15% of their demands for tires were satisfied, however, this lack was also explained by the fact that units have not built up a sufficient supply before the operation, and that motor vehicles arrived, before the operation, without tires. Much worse was the rubber pad situation - here the Corps could only obtain 5 000 pads of 35 000 they requested since they captured Brest-Litovsk. Unit reports also talk about a severe lack of spare parts, and nearly a complete lack of a supply of ready vehicle replacements. [12] Other than these comparatively minor gripes, mostly stemming from organisational deficiencies, much the same as previous operations. However, the overall lack of trucks still meant that the volume of supplies that could be moved around was insufficient. There were only 3 supply battalions available for the entire army for transport of supplies from railheads to forward units, with some 9,000 people, 6,600 vehicles and 19,000 ton capacity. For comparison, Allies in 1944 used no less than 69,000 tons of motor transport for 47 divisions in France.[13] Inability to sufficiently expand their supply system would plague Germans in operations to come.


   When it comes to horses, a complex organisation was created to care for them - a typical german army had 3 horse hospitals, 2 army horse parks and a veterinary examining station. The Tenth Army, for example, had for the care of its horses the 541st, 542nd, and 543rd Army Horse Hospitals, the 541st Army Horse Park, and the 540th Veterinary Park. It also had two blood examining stations.' At the lower level, each infantry division had its own divisional horse hospital, administered by the divisional veterinary nary company. There were apparently no veterinary units of any kind at corps level. Horses that were sick or injured were first passed to divisional hospital for treatment. Army hospitals and park were used as a back-up for these divisional units - divisional hospitals had a capacity of about 500 horses, while the army unit would have a capacity of 550. 

  The campaign was not problem-free in this regard either. The 14th Infantry Division, vision, for example, was still lacking veterinary equipment by 1 September ber 1939. The 19th Infantry Division of the XI Corps was urgently requesting the dispatch of fifty replacement horses immediately, although though the reason why was not specified.

    While the end result was a triumph for German arms, a number of high-ranking officers were not entirely pleased with the German Army's performance. The infantry had not been "vigorous in the attack." Even troops in the panzer and motorized units had gotten downright jittery at times. March discipline also remained poor. [14]

   

   

[1] Wolfgang Fleischer, Captured Weapons and Equipment of the Wehrmacht, pg. 9.

[2] https://tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/nazi_germany/Austrian_ADGZ.php
[3] http://armada.vojenstvi.cz/predvalecna/dokumenty/9.htm
[4] Gregory Liedtke, Enduring the Whirlwind, pg. 101
[5] http://www.kfzderwehrmacht.de/Hauptseite_deutsch/Kraftfahrzeuge/Tschechoslowakei/tschechoslowakei.html
[6] Nigel Askey,  Operation Barbarossa: The complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation, Volume IIA, kindle edition, location 10149.
[7] Bc. Pavel Pojikar, Výroba zbraní pro Wehrmacht a armády spojenců Německa v Českom Protektoráte.
[8] Lukas Friedli, Repairing the Panzers Vol. 1, pg. 21
[9] Walter M. Drzewieniecki, the Polish Army on the Eve of World War II, pg. 59.
[10] Steven J. Zaloga, Polish anti/tank defense and the 1939 campaign, pg. 255.
[11] Lukas Friedli, Repairing the Panzers Vol. 2, pg. 120
[12] Lukas Friedli, Repairing the Panzers Vol. 2, pg. 120-121
[13] David P. Coley, The Road to Victory.

[14] Richard L. DiNardo. Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism? Horses and the German Army of World War II, kindle edition. Locaction 332-348.