Ulater's Archive

"Attachment to the Gen. Dept. report No. III 012076/44, Tank and StuG allocation."    Report details the allocation of tanks and SPGs between different different Army Groups on 15.6.1944, from top to bottom left, Army groups are detailed in order : South-Ukraine, North-Ukraine, Middle, North, and other theaters Norway + Denmark, West, South-West and South-East.    Vehicles are divided into types, from (Panzer)II to VI, or Tigers, and categories: e. = einsatzbereit - ready-for-action i. = Instandsetzung - in repair z. = Zuführung - supplied, or rather allocations.    It can be clearly seen that at this point in time, Army Group West is clearly favored over every other formation which is, in light of D-day, understandable. Relatively low numbers of the eastern formations, even more glaring considering that this report was made a few days before Operation Bagration. This is largely epxlained by the fact that Ostheer sustained massive losses in the early year and spring of 1944,

Design born of necessity    Design of Jagdpanzer 38(t) was sparked by the ever increasing threat of allied bomber campaign, which targetted Alkett in October-November 1943, forcing Germans to disperse the production to Falkensee and Spandau,[1] and it effectively stopped the production in Alkett for many months to come.[2] Alternatives were chosen, one of them was to restart the Sturmgeschutz IV project, the other was to assemble StuG IIIs in BMM factory in Prague, however, there was a significant problem. BMM had no cranes with enough lifting capacity to handle the 24-ton Assault Guns. As a solution, in December 1943, a design for new Assault Gun was started, based on automotive parts of Panzer 38(t) and Panzer 38(t) neuer Art (New type). Specification called for a 13-ton vehicle, with frontal armor proof against most anti-tank guns. But the side armor was only to be proof against 7.92 mm machinegun fire and artillery fragments, and it was to be produced from SM (Siemens-Marteneit) lo

   It always turns out the same when one starts discussing the German tanks. It inevitably turns to Tigers and Panthers, which inevitably turns to either their reliability, or actual quality of their armor. Which will naturally lead to what people consider the holy grail on this subject, the test of Tiger II published on the English speaking side of the internet by the tank archives blog. It can be found here -  http://www.tankarchives.ca/2013/03/is-2-vs-german-big-cats.html  .    What is it about? Well, it is a rather "scathing review" based on a test of various guns performed on a Tiger II hull and turret, along with a different test of a Panther, which is not relevant now. What is relevant, is a rather large number of visual and contextual peculiarities for a comparatively short text. One hit Knock-out?     Author of the blog goes out of his way in setting-up a particular picture about this particular Tiger and this particular test. One can argue whether or not the placeme

"About tank losses of the 3rd Army for the period of 27.2 - 8.4.42. Tanks Heavy Medium Light Tankettes Total Available on 27.2. 36 20 275 50 381 Ready for action on 27.2. 29 19 248 45 341 Replacements from 27.2. to 8.4.42 30 --- 29 100 159     Losses Tanks Heavy Medium Light Tankettes Total Knocked-out 25 12 147 23 207 Burned-out --- 6 86 17 109 Disabled by mines 2 --- 17 2 21 Missing 1 2 --- 2 5 From the number of losses: Tanks Heavy Medium Light Tankettes Total Cannot be repaired -- 3 39 21 63 Not evacuated from the battlefield 7 4 70 5 86 Need capital repair 5 4 72 6 87 In medium repair 2 4 1 1 8 Repaired from the number of knocked-out and mined tanks. x/ 21 3 87 9 120 Tanks operational on 8.4.42 - 51 heavy tanks, 3 medium tanks, 120 light tanks and 111 tankettes for a total of 285 tanks. x/ Note: Many tanks were repaired twice, which is not reflected in this collumn. Signed Deputy Commander of the tank forces of Crimean Front, Major-General of the Tank Forces Volsky, on 13th A

Report was compiled based on information from several formations, on the result of shooting of armor of the german heavy tank Tiger II. The conclusions, report states that : "1. Shooting with AP and subcaliber shells from all listed guns, does not displace the turret from the turret ring. 2. From 100-250m, no type of shell from listed guns can penetrate the frontal armour of the hull or turret, not even with sharp angles of impact of no more than 46-48 degrees.. Single penetration of the frontal hull near the MG ball, was achieved by 152mm AP shell fired from 250m, at the striking angle of 86°. Breach Diameter = 350mm. 3. Drive train components (tracks, wheels) are vulnerable to all reported calibers." Distance Caliber Type Turret Front ° Hull Front ° Turret Side ° Sloped Side Armor ° Vertical Side Armor ° Rear Armor ° Suspension 250 m 152 mm API(?) --- --- Ric., dent w: 230 mm, d: 70 mm 46° Pen.entry w: 190 mm, exit w: 840 mm 86° --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 460 m --- --- ---