Motorization in Wehrmacht, pre-war era.
New myths to replace the old
"You have horses! What were you thinking!" - Is a now famous line from band of Brothers series, which came to symbolise the German army's lack of motorised transportation, or what looked like a lack of motorised transportation from the point of view of a simple US infantryman observing a collumn of german prisoners of war marching into captivity. If we forget that we are talking about a TV series and the context, that observation was not completely wrong. Other people, taking a more "serious"(and yet more simplistic) approach, just looked at the number of Panzer and Motorised divisions in relation to infantry divisions at any given time in german army, and they came to the conclusion that Wehrmacht was roughly 80% horse-drawn, which is mostly based on conjecture and out-dated information.[1] Even if one would accept that german infantry divisions were mostly horse-drawn, due to the number of horses compared to vehicles, it still is just a surface approach to a rather complex subject. And I think that the bulk of this discussion is about the notion of horse-drawn logistics rather than horse-drawn combat deployment anyway.
A rocky start of a mobile force
A truly mobile force needs a good resource base to feed a well organised automotive industry, and enough oil to fuel this force on a campaign. Germany was a very resource-poor country, that lacked everything from iron to oil. Germans received most of its iron from Sweden, with volume reaching just 10,3 million tons in 1943[2], Crude oil situation was much worse - Germany only produced 233,000 tons of crude oil in 1933, compared to Romanian production of 7,377,000 tons and Soviet production of 21,489,000 tons.[3] This was alleviated by the german synthetic oil production, but only to a small degree, because they managed to built just 21 synthetic oil plants by the time World War II ended in 1945. [4] What was far worse was the huge rubber deficit. Germany had neither a domestic or colonial source of rubber, and what little access it had from various trading partners was gradually blocked by the expansionism of the Nazi state. Synthetic rubber production stayed largely theoretical until the end of 1936, and production outstripped the meager imports of natural rubber only in 1940.[5] This would lead not only to a desperate situation with tires, but also huge problems with the supply of rubber pads for tracks. For example, XIX. Army Corps, in polish campaign, only received some 5 000 rubber pads while they requested 35 000.[6] There were other resource shortages, but steel, rubber and oil lacking in bulk proved to be one of the greatest barriers in vehicle production and deployment.
Germans performed multiple programs to provide vehicles for their future mobile army. First was the Einheits program, initiated as a part of Wehrmacht's rearmament program in 1934. It was an attempt to produce a series of standardised vehicles. Four chassis types were finally standardised on:
1. Light Einheits personnel carrier (car) (le. E-PKW)
2. Medium Einheits personnel carrier (m.E-PKW).
3. Heavy Einheits personnel carrier (s. E-PKW).
4. Light Einheits load carrier (le. E-LKW).
Generally these were good quality military vehicles with great cross-country performance, independent suspension, multi-axle drive and two axle steering. However, they were complex designs, which slowed down manufacture and caused maintenance difficulties.
The later Schell program was started in 1937 as it became apparent that Einheits program could not provide anywhere near required number of vehicles. It was mostly a plan to rationalised and further standardise wheeled vehicle production, both military and commercial, which brought good results - A reduction from 113 to 30 load carriers, from 52 to 10 personnel carriers, and from astounding 150 types of motorcycles to 30. On the other hand, these semi-commercial vehicles lacked the performance of earlier Einheits project. However, these still could not fulfill the needs of Wehrmacht, and german divisions, as opposed to allies that depended on USA to deliver wheeled vehicles, used both horse-drawn and motor vehicle until the end of the war.[8]
Given their industrial and economic deficiencies, germans took great interest in horses. When the British Army became a completely motorized force during the 1930s, the Germans bought up its stock of horses. They also purchased 25 000 horses from Hungary in 1935. They were registered in a system with ID numbers and cards with medical information issued for every horse. Inspectorate of Cavalry of the Army High Command had the last word on all equine matter, but in 1938, it was replaced with Inspectorate of Riding and Driving, that was responsible for remounts, breeding, procurement, distribution, management, registration and training of horses. [9]
There were several interesting doctrinal discussions on the deployment of horses, One of them revolved around whether the divisional anti-tank units should use horses, or trucks for their movement and combat deployment. A number of people in 1920s argued that anti-tank units should be motorized, because they should be able to travel as fast or faster than the tanks they were supposed to fight against. During the expansion however, some argued that AT units should be horse-drawn, which would be similar to the rest of the units in an infantry division. The advocates of speed won and german anti-tank units were largely motorized throughout the period.[10] German infantry division of the 1st mobilisation wave thus contained about 700-800 motor vehicles, most of them concentrated in divisional support units, then the AT-gun battalion, and finally HQ units.
Of the division’s logistical support units, the following were fully motorised:
- Infantry division HQ with divisional mapping detachment.
- Military police platoon and field post office.
- Divisional supply commander (HQ with support units).
- 3 motor transport columns (30 tons).
- 1 motor transport column for fuel (POL column, 25cbm)
- 1 supply company. 1 workshop (maintenance) company.
- 1 butchery company.
- 1 bakery company type "e".
- 1 commissary office.
- Medical units consisting of 1 medical company, 1 field hospital and 2 ambulance platoons.
Of the division’s logistical support units, the following were semi-motorised or horse-drawn:
- 3 transport columns.
- 3 light infantry columns.
- 1 veterinary company.
- 1 medical company.
There were minimal changes between tables of equipment in 1939 and 1941 for an average infantry division, this serves to illustrate a point well. What does this mean in a big picture? German army mobilized another 400,000 horses between 1938 and 1939, and on 1st September 1939, possessed some 590,000 horses.[12] In the meantime, some 105,536 trucks and a total of 253,978 vehicles were mobilized from German industry.[13] Production pre-war is harder to track down, but trucks with cars, motorcycles and other specialised vehicles could be estimated at another 400 000.
That's what I need! That's what I want to have!
- Hitler in 1933, after seeing motorised forces for the first time.
[7]
Needless to say, It can be seen that german automotive industry was very poor, as the number of vehicles per capita was smaller than any other major European power, and was worse than even some smaller countries. This, apart from obvious future lack of capacities for tank and vehicle production, indicates a relative lack of auto mechanics and experienced drivers for the army.
Germans performed multiple programs to provide vehicles for their future mobile army. First was the Einheits program, initiated as a part of Wehrmacht's rearmament program in 1934. It was an attempt to produce a series of standardised vehicles. Four chassis types were finally standardised on:
1. Light Einheits personnel carrier (car) (le. E-PKW)
2. Medium Einheits personnel carrier (m.E-PKW).
3. Heavy Einheits personnel carrier (s. E-PKW).
4. Light Einheits load carrier (le. E-LKW).
Generally these were good quality military vehicles with great cross-country performance, independent suspension, multi-axle drive and two axle steering. However, they were complex designs, which slowed down manufacture and caused maintenance difficulties.
The later Schell program was started in 1937 as it became apparent that Einheits program could not provide anywhere near required number of vehicles. It was mostly a plan to rationalised and further standardise wheeled vehicle production, both military and commercial, which brought good results - A reduction from 113 to 30 load carriers, from 52 to 10 personnel carriers, and from astounding 150 types of motorcycles to 30. On the other hand, these semi-commercial vehicles lacked the performance of earlier Einheits project. However, these still could not fulfill the needs of Wehrmacht, and german divisions, as opposed to allies that depended on USA to deliver wheeled vehicles, used both horse-drawn and motor vehicle until the end of the war.[8]
Given their industrial and economic deficiencies, germans took great interest in horses. When the British Army became a completely motorized force during the 1930s, the Germans bought up its stock of horses. They also purchased 25 000 horses from Hungary in 1935. They were registered in a system with ID numbers and cards with medical information issued for every horse. Inspectorate of Cavalry of the Army High Command had the last word on all equine matter, but in 1938, it was replaced with Inspectorate of Riding and Driving, that was responsible for remounts, breeding, procurement, distribution, management, registration and training of horses. [9]
There were several interesting doctrinal discussions on the deployment of horses, One of them revolved around whether the divisional anti-tank units should use horses, or trucks for their movement and combat deployment. A number of people in 1920s argued that anti-tank units should be motorized, because they should be able to travel as fast or faster than the tanks they were supposed to fight against. During the expansion however, some argued that AT units should be horse-drawn, which would be similar to the rest of the units in an infantry division. The advocates of speed won and german anti-tank units were largely motorized throughout the period.[10] German infantry division of the 1st mobilisation wave thus contained about 700-800 motor vehicles, most of them concentrated in divisional support units, then the AT-gun battalion, and finally HQ units.
Of the division’s logistical support units, the following were fully motorised:
- Infantry division HQ with divisional mapping detachment.
- Military police platoon and field post office.
- Divisional supply commander (HQ with support units).
- 3 motor transport columns (30 tons).
- 1 motor transport column for fuel (POL column, 25cbm)
- 1 supply company. 1 workshop (maintenance) company.
- 1 butchery company.
- 1 bakery company type "e".
- 1 commissary office.
- Medical units consisting of 1 medical company, 1 field hospital and 2 ambulance platoons.
Of the division’s logistical support units, the following were semi-motorised or horse-drawn:
- 3 transport columns.
- 3 light infantry columns.
- 1 veterinary company.
- 1 medical company.
[11]
There were minimal changes between tables of equipment in 1939 and 1941 for an average infantry division, this serves to illustrate a point well. What does this mean in a big picture? German army mobilized another 400,000 horses between 1938 and 1939, and on 1st September 1939, possessed some 590,000 horses.[12] In the meantime, some 105,536 trucks and a total of 253,978 vehicles were mobilized from German industry.[13] Production pre-war is harder to track down, but trucks with cars, motorcycles and other specialised vehicles could be estimated at another 400 000.
Is the wheel mightier than the hoof?
Horse teams were already mentioned before. What does this term mean? Most people, when seeing the number of horses used by Wehrmacht compared to the number of their trucks and other motorised vehicles write off the German army as a horse-drawn force, this however is an error. Most horses were organised in teams of 2, 4 and up to 8 horses in teams per task given. Artillery especially needed 6-8 horses per piece to tow, and divisions were equipped with 84 limbers for them, while the entire complement of horse according to the ToE was 1,740 saddle horses and 3,630 draft horses. There were 1189 horse teams, and an average horse team had a lift capacity of around 1.25 metric tons. 516 trucks in the division had an average of 2.5 metric ton capacity, and 237 ligher vehicles had a capacity of 0.6 tons. Here we can see that a supposedly horse-drawn infantry division, if halftracks and all motorcycles that were mostly able to carry 3 men and an MG around the battlefield, had 53% of its lift capacity fully motorised. Therefore, one can rightly rename the "horse-drawn" german infantry divisions to "semi-motorised".[14]
[1] http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/germanhorse/index.html
[2] Richard L. DiNardo. Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism? Horses and the German Army of World War II (Contributions in Military Studies, Number 113), page 3.
[3] Ibid, page 3-4.
[4] Anthony Stranges, Germany's synthetic fuel industry, 1927-1945, page 148.
[5] Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, The Making and Breaking of the Nazi economy, page 228.
[6] Lukas Friedli, Repairing the Panzers Vol.2, page 121.
[7] Nigel Askey, Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation, Volume IIB, page 110.
[8] Nigel Askey, Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation, Volume IIA, page 100-101.
[9] Richard L. DiNardo. Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism? Horses and the German Army of World War II (Contributions in Military Studies, Number 113), page 10-11.
[4] Anthony Stranges, Germany's synthetic fuel industry, 1927-1945, page 148.
[5] Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, The Making and Breaking of the Nazi economy, page 228.
[6] Lukas Friedli, Repairing the Panzers Vol.2, page 121.
[7] Nigel Askey, Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation, Volume IIB, page 110.
[8] Nigel Askey, Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation, Volume IIA, page 100-101.
[9] Richard L. DiNardo. Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism? Horses and the German Army of World War II (Contributions in Military Studies, Number 113), page 10-11.
[10] Ibid, page 14.
[11] Nigel Askey, Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation, Volume IIA, page 156-158.
[12]Richard L. DiNardo. Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism? Horses and the German Army of World War II (Contributions in Military Studies, Number 113), page 17.
[13] Lukas Friedli, Repairing the Panzers Vol.1, page 21.
[14] Nigel Askey, Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation, Volume IIA, page 165.
[11] Nigel Askey, Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation, Volume IIA, page 156-158.
[12]Richard L. DiNardo. Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism? Horses and the German Army of World War II (Contributions in Military Studies, Number 113), page 17.
[13] Lukas Friedli, Repairing the Panzers Vol.1, page 21.
[14] Nigel Askey, Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation, Volume IIA, page 165.
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