Ulater's Archive

  - Collumns numbered 2, 3 and 4 are monthly averages of losses for given time periods, 5th is a month where highest average losses occured. collumns 6 and 7 are monthly losses according to preliminary reports. A.) Wounded and Sick due to enemy action. I. Heer (including field and reserve army, Waffen-SS and volunteer formations)  () - numbers in brackets are the number of officers included Total - 3,881,883 (99,859) a.) East - 3,459,568  (88,846) b.) Geb. AOK 20 - 60,311 (1,430) c.) AOK Norway u.W.B. Denmark - 92 (4) d.) Ob. South-west - 158,134 (4,287) e.) Ob. South-east - 22,794 (537) f.) Ob. West - 180,984 (4,755) g.) Reserve army -  21,660 (542) II. Kriegsmarine : Total - 25,259 (554)  - including: a.) Atlantic and other oceans - 15,854 (382) b.) East - 6,691 (125) c.) Mediterranean Sea - 2,174 (47) III. Luftwaffe: Total - 199,726 (8,154) Without - Operational losses, schools and other services - 190,841 (7,232) - including: a

  - Collumns numbered 2, 3 and 4 are monthly averages of losses for given time periods, 5th is a month where highest average losses occured. collumns 6 and 7 are monthly losses according to preliminary reports. A.) Dead due to enemy action. I. Heer (including field and reserve army, Waffen-SS and volunteer formations)  () - numbers in brackets are the number of officers included Total - 1,517,905 (56,022)  a.) East - 1,091962 (41,017) b.) Geb. AOK 20 - 16,032 (513) c.) AOK Norway u.W.B. Denmark - 428 (15) d.) Ob. South-west - 48,748 (1,944) e.) Ob. South-east - 16,532 (609) f.) Ob. West - 58,276 (2.176) g.) Reserve army -  7,447 (294) - Died of wounds - 278,480 (9,434) II. Kriegsmarine : Total - 34.988 (2,105)  - including: a.) Atlantic and other oceans - 22,377 (1,580) b.) East - 8,039 (297) c.) Mediterranean Sea - 4,582 (229) III. Luftwaffe: Total - 121,049 (7.183) Without - Operational losses, schools and other services

Statistical analysis    There are many more personal accounts and other circumstantial evidence about Sherman tank catching on fire easily, which could be easily dismissed, however this occurence could also be traced and easily shown in works of a more "academic" nature, where it persisted until the end of World War 2.     A report from April 1945 claims that 60-90% of Sherman tanks are lost by burning, and practically all of them catch on fire when hit by a panzerfaust. Report also states that, according to the Ninth US army, as opposed to the usual rate of burning between 60-90% in typical Sherman tanks, M4 (76)s equipped with wet stowage only burned in 5-10% cases, however, First US army could not support such figures.[1] This report, quoted only partly and popularised by Steven Zaloga in mainstream literature, and used by people sometimes as an evidence that this problem was solved,actually reveals the disturbing persistence of fires even as late as 1945, and pr

   8th Air force lost a total of 522 fighters to enemy flak, and 7 aircraft to friendly AA fire for a total of 529 fighters lost.     65th fighter wing provided detailed information on causes leading to losses. This unit lost 19 P-38s, 53 P-47s and 120 P-51s, 192 fighters. 75 were lost while strafing airfields, followed by 21 losses sustained while "strafing targets of opportunity" and 19 were lost while "Flak busting". Remaining losses were divided between various causes from fighters lost while strafing trains to fighters being lost while flying low over battle line. - Strategic Fighters vs. Flak in the ETO., written in August 1945, pg. 241-244.

"Commander of a panzerjager abteilung in the East reports: I report, that the 1. tank mechanic of the company, feldwebel Pratzer, and company tank drivers - Uffz. Handrack, Obgefr. Diewok. Obgefr. Zell and Obgefr. Borngen performed well and achieved exceptional results. The drivers mentioned drove their Pak 40 (t) self-propelled guns on August 30, 1943 and since then traveled a distance of  roughly 4000 km  without a change of motors, transmissions or suspensions. Tracks were changed once at 3000 km. The sprocket gears, which are now worn out to about a half, have not yet been changed.  Distances traveled were read from the odometer, and represent a minimum. These results were achieved in a complex terrain under exceptional circumstances (encirlements and withdrawals from Kiev to Korosten - Winnitza in Stanislau area.). The self-propelled guns have been operational until they were released from the siege of Kameniec - Podolski on 11.4.1944. The self-propelled guns c

"German tank losses on the east between 22.6.41 and 21.12.1944 Russians report 70 366 german tanks destroyed from 22.6.41 to 31.12.1944    For the same time period,  the following actual losses of armored fighting vehicles were reported  by GenStdH/Gen.Qu. :"    Table is organized in collumns for tanks, StuGs, Self-proppeled artillery and Sp. AT-guns, halftracks and armored cars and "other". Panzers include - Pz I - VI, 38(t), command tanks, observation tanks and flamethrower tanks. StuGs include - StuG III, StuH, Sturmpanzer, jagdpanzer IV and 38(t), Jagdpanther and Elefant. Self-proppeled artillery and Sp. AT-guns inc. - AT-guns on Pz II and 38(t), Nashorn, Wespe, Hummel and Sp. guns on 38(t). Other inc. - munnition panzer III and IV, Bergepanzers III, IV and 38(t), flakpanzers on 38(t) and panzer IV chassis and Borgwards .

Normandy, continued   Propensity to burn brightly, and easily, surfaces in various books and report through the Normandy campaing again, and again. Even the good old Ronson rears its ugly head :  "Allied crews were also greatly concerned about the unnerving propensity of the Sherman to burst into flames, or ‘brew up’, when penetrated and disabled. With sardonic humour, crews christened their Shermans ‘Ronsons’ after the cigarette lighter, which, according to the advertising slogan, always lit first time. One commander noted that ‘a hit almost inevitably meant a “brew-up” . . . you were in a Ronson and if you were hit it was best to bale out p.d.q.’ Crews in one regiment even went into battle with the driver’s and co-driver’s hatches open to expedite baling out when hit. A series of notes and memos was fed back to the RAC during the Normandy campaign, many claiming that the Sherman brewed up very quickly or that fires too frequently followed penetration, and that alarm and

What is it?    Practically all people familliar with the history of WWII and tanks in particular are aware of the bad reputation of the M4 Sherman tank for being prone to catching on fire after penetration, to the point it was nick-named "Ronson" by the british tank crews, after a brand of cigarette lighter. People dispute this mainly because the nickname is sometimes joined with the slogan - "Lights first, every time." Origins of this slogan are rather unclear, as none of the interwar slogans seem to display this exact phrase, this one coming closest : The ad was released in 1927. But was it really like that?    Early modifications programmes of applique armor over sponson stowage, and wet ammunition racks suggest that this problem manifested even with early Sherman tanks in North Africa and Italy. And while wet stowage definetly helped, applique armor was deemed ineffective. However, an entirely separate problem surfaced in Italian campaig

  It is a commonly established belief that an average Panther tank would hardly last past a full fuel tank without mechanical breakdown, however, this one driver brought his machine, a recovery vehicle based on Panther's hull, on quite a journey. "IX Exceptional achievements of tank drivers 1. Achievements of a Panther recovery tank drivers Performance of a Panther-recovery tank driver. Unteroffizier Krause of a Panther workshop platoon has up to 3 May 1944 driven his Panther recovery tank – Chassis No. 212132 – 4,200km without an engine change or damage to the transmission, including the final drive units, gearbox and drive shaft. Approximately 1,000km of this was made towing a Panther tank. The vehicle and engine are still in excellent condition and continue to be operational. Inspector General of tank forces awards a special recognition of service to Unteroffizier Krause."    Chassis No. 212132 was, according to  www.panther1944.de

This report describes the studies undertaken on the four  german SPGs used in service in the war. They are the Panzer Jager 35(t), Jagdpanzer IV, Jagdpanther and Jagdtiger. The object of this study was to examine the main armament loading arrangement and assess the loading times, and  examine the crew's controls, accomodation and comfort. Seems simple enough. British researchers made several brief conclusions -  controls were badly positioned and accomidations were generally unsatisfactory, but ammo stowage was well-positioned. (i) When the gun is traversed left or right, it hems in certain members of the crew, to the detriment of the performance of their duties. (ii) Crew seating is badly designed and positioned. (iii) Vision devices are badly mounted and positioned, and in many cases inadequate. (iv) Gun controls are badly positioned. (v) Driving controls are badly positioned. (vi) Basically, the ammunition stowage is well-positioned, but bin fittings and the